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Abstract
This paper analyzes a randomized experiment to shed light on the role of information
and social interactions in employees’ decisions to enroll in a Tax Deferred Account (TDA)
retirement plan within a large university. The experiment encouraged a random sample of
employees in a subset of departments to attend a beneﬁts information fair organized by the
university, by promising a monetary reward for attendance. The experiment multiplied by
more than 5 the attendance rate of these treated individuals (relative to controls), and tripled
that of untreated individuals within departments where some individuals were treated. TDA
enrollment 5 and 11 months after the fair was signiﬁcantly higher in departments where some
individuals were treated than in departments where nobody was treated. However, the eﬀect
on TDA enrollment is almost as large for individuals in treated departments who did not
receive the encouragement as for those who did. We provide three interpretations, diﬀerential
treatment eﬀects, social network eﬀects, and motivational reward eﬀects, to account for these
results.
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11 Introduction
There is growing concern in the United States about low levels of savings for retirement. For
most U.S. families, employers’ pensions is the main source of cash income during retirement, over
and above Social Security beneﬁts (see e.g., Poterba, Venti, and Wise [1996]). However, over
the last 25 years, traditional Deﬁned Beneﬁts and Deﬁned Contribution employer pension plans
where employee participation is mandatory have been partly replaced with Tax Deferred Account
(TDA) retirement plans such as 401(k)s where employees choose whether to participate and how
much to save for their retirement (see Poterba, Venti, and Wise [2001]). As a result, most U.S.
workers now have to make a decision about how much to save for their retirement, instead of
being passive participants in their employer’s pension plan. This makes it very important to
understand how retirement savings decisions are made.
Deciding how much to save for retirement and how to invest requires to solve a complicated
intertemporal optimization problem, and to have information about the rules governing diﬀerent
instruments. In such a context, one could expect that information may have a large impact on
savings behavior. As a result, ﬁnancial education is considered as a potentially important avenue
to improve the quality of ﬁnancial decision making, both by policy makers [Summers 2000] and
by companies. A telephone survey we conducted with all Fortune 500 companies revealed that
71 percent of these companies systematically hold ﬁnancial information sessions. A further
10 percent conducts them occasionally. Bernheim and Garrett [1996], Bayer, Bernheim, and
Scholz [1996], and Bernheim, Garrett and Maki [2001], among others, present evidence that
participation in a ﬁrm’s savings plan is higher when ﬁrms oﬀer ﬁnancial education. However,
they recognize that an employers’ decision to provide this information might be endogenous,
which complicates the interpretation of these diﬀerences.
Because how much and how to save is a diﬃcult decision, it is also likely that individuals’
decisions are aﬀected by the decisions of others in their peer group. First, they may obtain
information about the employer retirement plan from discussions with their colleagues, or make
inferences based on observing their decisions. Second, consumption and savings behavior may be
subject to peer pressure and social norms, leading to conformity in behavior. As a result, social
network eﬀects within the workplace might play an important role in the decision to contribute
1to 401(k) retirement plans.
This paper analyzes the evidence from a randomized experiment, designed to shed light on
both the role of information and social interactions on the employees’ decision to enroll in the
employer sponsored TDA plan of a large university. This allows us to overcome some of the
very diﬃcult identiﬁcation problems in the presence of peer eﬀects, described notably in Manski
[1993, 1995].
Each year, the university organizes and invites all of its employees to a beneﬁts fair in order
to provide information on beneﬁts. In particular, a stated goal of the fair is to increase the
enrollment rate in TDA which is relatively low (around 35 percent). Obviously, comparing the
TDA enrollment decisions of fair attendees to those who did not attend the fair would not
provide convincing evidence of a causal eﬀect of fair attendance on TDA enrollment, because
the decision to attend the fair is endogenous.1 To circumvent this selection problem, we have
implemented the following experiment. We selected a random sample of employees not yet
enrolled in the TDA and sent them an invitation letter promising a $20 reward for attending the
fair. This type of experiment is a classical encouragement design, often used in medical science,
where treatments are oﬀered to a random group of patients who then decide whether or not to
take the treatment. Furthermore, we designed our experiment such that we are able to estimate
social interaction eﬀects. Namely, “treated” individuals who were sent the invitation letter were
selected only within a random subset of departments (the “treated” departments).
The ﬁrst stage of our study analyzes the eﬀect of the invitation letter on fair attendance.
Treated individuals are more than ﬁve times as likely to attend the fair as control individuals.
Interestingly, non-treated individuals in treated departments are three times as likely to attend
the fair as control individuals in non-treated departments, despite the fact that only original
letter recipients could claim the $20 reward. This shows that the invitation letters not only
increased the fair attendance rate for individuals who received them but also had a spill-over
social eﬀect on their colleagues within departments.
The second stage of the study tries to estimate the causal eﬀect of fair attendance and social
1For example, individuals who had already decided to enroll, but are not sure exactly how much they wanted
to contribute, may be more likely to attend the fair. See Madrian and Shea [2002] for evidence of selection in the
decision to attend information sessions within a large ﬁrm.
2eﬀects on the decision to enroll in the TDA. We show that, 5 and 11 months after the fair,
individuals in treated departments are signiﬁcantly more likely to have started contributing to
the TDA than control individuals. This shows that our experiment, and hence the fair, was
successful in increasing TDA enrollment. However, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in TDA
enrollment between those who actually received our encouragement letter and those in the same
departments who did not. We propose three diﬀerent interpretations, not necessarily mutually
exclusive, to account for these facts. First, this could be explained by social eﬀects at the
department level. Fair attendees might be able to spread information obtained from the fair in
their departments. Second, our results could also be explained by diﬀerential treatment eﬀects.
Employees who come to the fair only because of the ﬁnancial reward are diﬀerent from those
who decide to come to the fair because of their colleagues, and it is plausible to think that the
treatment eﬀect is larger for the latter group than for the former. Finally, our results might also
be explained by motivational reward eﬀects. Paying individuals to attend the fair might aﬀect
their subjective motivation and therefore the perceived value or quality of the information they
obtain at the fair. Our experiment does not allow us to separately identify these three eﬀects
but it allows us to conclude that the important decision about how much to save for retirement
can be aﬀected by small shocks such as a very small ﬁnancial reward and/or the inﬂuence of
peers, and thus does not seem to be the consequence of an elaborate decision process.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief discussion of
the mechanisms by which ﬁnancial education and social interactions can aﬀect retirement savings
decisions. Section III describes the beneﬁts fair and the design of our experiment. Section IV
discusses the reduced form evidence. Section V develops a simple model to interpret our results.
Finally, Section VI oﬀers a brief conclusion.
2 Information and Social Interactions in Savings Decisions
A number of recent studies have emphasized the important role of factors others than ﬁnancial
incentives in the decision to enroll in TDA plans. Madrian and Shea [2001] and Choi, Laibson,
Madrian, and Metrick [2001a, 2001b] show that default rules have an enormous impact on
employees’ participation, contributions, and asset allocations. When employees are enrolled by
3default in a TDA, very few opt out and most employees do not change the default contribution
rate or the default allocation of assets. This evidence could be interpreted in two ways: either
individuals lack information, and interpret the default option as a signal, or they do not think
very much about their retirement savings, and can be inﬂuenced by very small changes in their
environment. Distinguishing these two mechanisms is important, since they have very diﬀerent
policy implications. If lack of information is important, this suggests a potentially important
role for ﬁnancial education sessions, through which individuals can obtain general information
about retirement plan features as well as be guided through their inter-temporal maximization
decision. If, however, ﬁnancial education has only a modest impact on retirement plan decisions,
this suggests that the second hypothesis is true.
The literature on social interactions suggests that in both cases, social interactions are likely
to aﬀect retirement decisions. First, individuals may learn from their co-workers, either through
discussions or by making inferences from their actions. The literature on informational cascades
[Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch 1992, Banerjee 1992, Ellison and Fudenberg 1993] provide
reasons why information (correct or not) obtained from co-workers may be an important factor in
deciding whether to participate and how to invest—giving rise to peer eﬀects. Second, savings
decisions may be inﬂuenced by social norms or beliefs about social norms. By observing co-
workers, people can learn about the proper behavior of their social group, as emphasized by
models of conformity [Bernheim 1994]. Individuals may want to maintain the same consumption
level as what is common in their social group. In both cases, there is a “social multiplier” eﬀect:
the aggregate impact of an intervention on a group is larger than the sum of its eﬀects on each
individual’s decision. As discussed in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [2002], it is often
important for policy purposes to separate direct individual eﬀects from social multiplier eﬀects.
There is a growing empirical literature which shows evidence of social interaction eﬀects in
a number of areas. Some empirical papers have focused on information transmission 2, while
others have focused on peer pressure.3 Most of these studies are observational and hence subject
to diﬃcult identiﬁcation problems [Manski 1993, 1995].
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [1996, 2002] propose two main avenues to obtain sug-
2See Besley and Case [1994], Foster and Rosenzweig [1995] on technology adoption in developing countries.
3See for example Evans, Oates and Schwab [1992] on teenagers’ behavior, Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Luttner
[2000] on welfare participation, and Munshi [2000] on contraception.
4gestive evidence on the presence of social interaction eﬀects. First, in the presence of positive
spillovers, the variance across social groups will be larger than what would be predicted by ran-
dom draws. Second, there will be a correlation between individual behavior and a prediction of
aggregate behavior based on demographic characteristics in the group. Duﬂo and Saez [2002a]
show that, in the university studied in this paper, both eﬀects are present: there is little vari-
ance of participation within departments, compared to the variance in participation rates across
departments, and individual participation rates are correlated with predicted participation in
their peer groups. While this evidence is suggestive, it might be contaminated by omitted vari-
ables, correlated within the group and correlated with the observed variables used to predict
aggregate participation rates. To address this problem, we set up a randomized experiment,
where we aﬀect the incentives of a subset of the peer group in some randomly selected groups,
and evaluate whether the impact of this intervention extends beyond the targeted group, which
would be direct evidence of a social multiplier eﬀect.4
3 Context and Experiment Design
3.1 Beneﬁts and the Beneﬁts Fair
The university we study has approximately 12,500 employees. About a quarter of the employees
are faculty members. Our study was limited to non-faculty employees only.5 The university
provides retirement beneﬁts to its employees through a traditional mandatory pension plan
but employees can also voluntary contribute to a complementary Tax Deferred Account (TDA)
403(b) plan. Every employee can contribute to the 403(b) plan any percentage of their salary up
to the IRS limit ($10,500 per year for each individual in 2001). The university does not match
4Two recent studies have used experimental or quasi-experimental situations to study social interaction eﬀects.
Katz, Kling, and Liebman [2001] evaluate a randomly assigned housing voucher program whereby households living
in high poverty public housing projects were given the opportunity to move out of the project. Sacerdote [2001]
analyzes peer-eﬀects among ﬁrst-year students in Dartmouth’s college randomly assigned to dorms. Both studies
have found evidence of spillovers.
5Duﬂo and Saez [2002a] present suggestive evidence that staﬀ employees TDA choices are not inﬂuenced by
faculty choices and vice-versa. Furthermore staﬀ employees may be more representative of average U.S. workers
than faculty members.
5contributions. Employees can choose how to invest their contributions in any combination of
four diﬀerent vendors.
Each year, the university organizes a beneﬁts fair where all employees are invited to come
and learn about the diﬀerent kinds of beneﬁts (such as health beneﬁts, retirement beneﬁts,
etc.) provided by the university. The fair is held on two consecutive days in early November
in two diﬀerent locations, each one close to the two separate main university campuses. About
one week before the fair, every employee receives a letter through the university mail system
inviting her to attend the fair. This letter also provides a brief description of the event. At the
same time, under separate cover, every employee receives a packet describing in detail university
beneﬁts along with enrollment forms. November is “open enrollment” month during which each
employee may change her beneﬁts choices by submitting the enrollment form. If the employee
does not send back the form, her beneﬁts choices are automatically carried over from the previous
year. However, employees are free to enroll in the TDA or change their contribution level or
investment decision at any time throughout the year.
In both locations, the fair is held in a large hotel reception room. There are a large number of
stands representing the university Beneﬁts Oﬃce, and the various health and retirement beneﬁts
service providers. The university Beneﬁts Oﬃce oﬀers information on all beneﬁts through direct
conversation with Beneﬁts Oﬃce staﬀ present at the fair, and through a number of information
pamphlets freely available at their stand. The beneﬁts oﬃce also provides information on how
the other stands at the fair are organized. These other stands are run by each of the specialized
service providers. For example, each of the mutual fund vendors has a stand at which they
provide information about the TDA plan and the speciﬁc services they oﬀer within that plan.
The fair also oﬀers individuals the chance to use a specially designed computer program to
analyze their speciﬁc situation. Employees are free to come any time during the three and a
half hours during which the fair is held, and visit any number of stands they want.
3.2 Experiment Design
The university organizes the annual fair in order to disseminate information about beneﬁts and
help its employees make better decisions. The beneﬁts oﬃce of the university realizes that
the participation rate among staﬀ (34 percent) is too low compared to other universities, and
6suspects that this may be due to lack of information.
In order to identify the causal eﬀect of fair attendance on TDA enrollment, we set up an
“encouragement design”, by promising a random subset of employees a small amount of money
for attending the fair. In order to shed light on social eﬀects within departments, we sent those
letters only within a random subset of departments. There are thus two distinct treatments in
our experiment: receiving the letter, and being in the same department as someone who receives
a letter.
We used a cross-section of administrative data provided by the university on all its employees
as of August, 2000. We restricted the sample to staﬀ employees (i.e., non-faculty employees)
aged less than 65 and eligible to participate in the TDA. Of the 9,700 employees meeting these
criteria, around 3,500 were enrolled in the TDA as of August, 2000. From now on, we refer
to these individuals as the pre-enrolled individuals. The remaining 6,200 individuals were not
enrolled in the TDA by August, 2000. As very few employees stop contributing to the TDA
once they are enrolled, we focus on the decision to start participating into the TDA. Thus the
sample of 6,200 non-enrolled individuals is our sample of primary interest.6
The University is divided into 330 departments. Departments include each of the academic
departments such as Economics, or Cell Biology, etc. In addition to academic departments,
there are many administrative departments. For example, each library is a separate department.
Each of the dinning halls is also a department. In most cases, each department has a single
geographical location. Departments sometimes share a same building or ﬂoor within a building
but even in those cases, work interactions within departments are much more intense than
across departments.7 Of course, there is communication across departments but it is mainly
concentrated among higher ranked employees within departments.8 The average number of staﬀ
employees per department is 30, but the median size is much smaller, around 15. Therefore,
6Only 80 of the 3,500 employees enrolled in the TDA stopped contributing during the one year period we
examine. More than ﬁve times as many employees started contributing to the TDA during the same period. We
have not found any signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the decision to stop contributing to the TDA across treated and
non-treated departments.
7Academics know very well that, even when departments are close geographically, interactions across depart-
ments are always minimal. To a large extent, the same is true for staﬀ in administrative departments.
8For example, administrative managers from diﬀerent departments participate to many meetings with the
central administration.
7except in a few large departments, we would expect each employee to know most of her colleagues
in the department. The fact that departments may not correspond exactly to social units should
lead to an attenuation bias in our social network eﬀects estimates.
In the ﬁrst step, we randomly selected two thirds of the departments of the university (220
out of a total of 330) as follows. In order to maximize the power of the experiment (in a
context in which we know there are strong department eﬀects), we ﬁrst matched departments
according to their size (i.e., number of employees) and participation rate in the TDA before the
fair. We separated department into deciles of participation rates among the staﬀ. Each decile
contains 33 departments. We then ranked them by size within each decile, and formed groups of
three departments by putting three consecutive departments on these lists in the same triplet.
Within each of these triplets, we randomly selected two departments to be part of the group of
treated departments. From now on, we denote by the dummy variable D the treatment status
of departments. We have D = 1 in treated departments, and D = 0 in control departments.
In the second step, within each of the treated departments, any individual not enrolled as
of August 2000, was selected with a probability of one-half.9 This treatment group is composed
of 2,039 individuals. From now on, we denote by the dummy variable L the selection status of
individuals. We refer to this group as the Treated individuals and denote them by 11 (D = 1
for Treated department and L = 1 for being selected). The group formed by the employees in
the treated departments who were not selected contains 2,129 individuals and is denoted by 10
(D = 1 for Treated department and L = 0 for not being selected). In total, there are 4,168
individuals in the treated departments. The control group is formed by employees in the control
departments where no treatments were selected; it contains 2,043 individuals and is denoted by
00 (D = 0 and L = 0).
One week before the fair, we sent a letter via university mail to the 2,039 employees in the
treatment group 11. The letter reminded them of the fair and informed them that they would
receive a check for $20 from us if they were to come to the fair and register at our desk. This
letter is reproduced in the appendix.
At the fair, we set up a stand for the employees who received our invitation letter to register
their name. Unfortunately, the Beneﬁts Oﬃce did not authorize us to record the names of the
9This selection probability is independent across individuals.
8fair participants who did not receive our letter. However, we recorded their total number: a
student stood at the fair entrance and distributed a coupon to each person who entered the hall.
The coupons had diﬀerent colors according to the status of the participant (active or retired),
which allowed us to count the number of active employees who attended the fair. Everybody
had to pass through the narrow entrance to enter the fair, and the few people who refused
the coupon were carefully counted. We are thus conﬁdent that we accurately recorded the
number of participants. In order to collect information on the TDA status and the department
aﬃliation of all the fair participants, we organized a raﬄe. The coupons that were distributed
at the entrance of the fair had two parts, with a number written twice. Each fair attendant who
wanted to participate in the raﬄe gave us half of the coupon. We asked all the raﬄe participants
their department aﬃliation and whether they were currently enrolled in the TDA. The raﬄe
was held every 30 minutes, and the prize was a $50 Macy’s gift certiﬁcate. A total of 1,617
active employees attended the fair. 573 of them had received our letter. Out of the remaining
1,044 employees, 766 (i.e., about three quarters) came to play the raﬄe and registered their
department aﬃliation and TDA enrollment status. An important issue that arises is whether
there was selection by D = 1 versus D = 0 departments in who decided to play the raﬄe (and
hence provide their department aﬃliation and TDA status). We do not believe this was the
case. Most of those who refused to play the raﬄe did so because they visited our stand just
after the previous raﬄe had been played, and did not want to stay at the fair long enough to
wait for the next raﬄe. Therefore, we assume that fair attendants who did not register their
department aﬃliation are distributed between D = 1 and D = 0 departments as those who did
register. Therefore, in what follows, we scale up the attendance recorded in each department by
a factor of 1,044/766.10
In order to assess the eﬀects of the experiment and the fair on TDA participation, the
university provided us with three waves of data. The ﬁrst wave was obtained in September,
2000, just before the fair. The second wave was from March, 2001 (4.5 months after the fair),
and the third wave from October, 2001 (11 months after the fair).
10We will discuss how modifying this assumption would aﬀect our results.
94 Results: Summary Statistics and Reduced Form Diﬀerences
In the presence of social interactions, employees who work in departments where some people
received the letter can be aﬀected by the experiment even if they did not receive the letter
themselves. They may be more likely to come to the fair themselves, because they are reminded
by others of the event, or because employees come to the fair in groups.11 They may also be more
likely to enroll in the TDA even if they do not come to the fair themselves, either because they
are directly inﬂuenced by the action of those who went to the fair, or because these individuals
share the information they gathered at the fair. Thus, employees are potentially subjected to
two kinds of treatments: They can receive the invitation letter themselves (group 11), or they
can be in a department where some employees received the letter (group 10 and group 11).
Those who receive the letter are, obviously, subject to both treatments.
The summary statistics are displayed in Table I, broken down into 4 groups. In columns (1)
to (3), we present the statistics for individuals who belong to treated departments. Column (1)
has the statistics for the entire group (group D = 1), column (2) has the statistics for the group
of treated individuals (group 11), and column (3) has the statistics for the untreated individuals
in treated departments (group 10). In column (4), we present the statistics for individuals who
belong to the untreated departments (group 00).12
Panel A presents background characteristics. In the ﬁrst wave (in September, 2000, before
the fair), a very small proportion of employees started contributing to the TDA (the ﬁrst wave
is from September, 2000, but we used data from August, 2000, to construct the randomization),
but there is no apparent diﬀerence across groups in these proportions. Since we are interested
in changes caused by the fair, we focus in the remainder of the analysis on individuals who were
still not enrolled in the ﬁrst wave (i.e., by September, 2000). Because the groups were chosen
randomly, the mean of observable characteristics such as sex, years of service, annual salary, and
age, are very similar across groups and none of the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant.
In Panel B, we can see that our inducement strategy had a dramatic eﬀect on the probability
of attending the fair: In treated departments, as many as 21.4 percent of individuals attended the
11This is something we observed at the fair.
12It is important to note that all these statistics (except the ﬁrst row of Panel A and the second row of Panel
B) focus only on individuals not enrolled in the TDA on September, 2000, before the fair.
10fair. In control departments, fewer than 5 percent of individuals attended the fair. Comparing
treated individuals versus controls in the treated departments in columns (2) and (3) shows that
social eﬀects account for a large fraction of the eﬀect of our experiment on fair attendance. The
fair attendance rate of those who received our letter is 28 percent, and is 15.1 percent for those
in the treated departments who did not receive the letter. Thus, the diﬀerence in the attendance
rate between the 10 group and the group 00 (which is solely due to social eﬀects) is over 10
percentage points.13
In Panel C, we look at TDA participation. After 4.5 months, relatively few people have
enrolled. However, employees in treated departments are already signiﬁcantly more likely to
be enrolled than employees in control departments (4.9 percent versus 4 percent). However,
individuals in group 11 are not more likely to be enrolled than individuals in group 10. The
diﬀerence between groups 10 and 00 is relatively large at 1.3 percentage points. Eleven months
after the fair, enrollment is higher still, and the diﬀerence between treated departments and
control departments is 1.4 percentage points. The diﬀerence between groups 11 and 10 is now
positive, but still very small and insigniﬁcant. The diﬀerence between group D = 1 and group
D = 0 remains equal to 1.3 percentage points.
In order to analyze the diﬀerences, we consider simple reduced form regression speciﬁcations.
Denote respectively by fij and yij the fair attendance and the TDA enrollment decisions of
individual i in department j. Similarly, Lij is the dummy for receiving the inducement letter
and Dj the treatment status of the department. The average eﬀects on fair attendance and
TDA enrollment of being in a treated department (D = 1) versus a control department (D = 0)
(irrespective of individual treatment status L) are captured by the following speciﬁcations:
fij = α1 + β1Dj + ij, (1)
and
yij = α2 + β2Dj + ηij. (2)
13This result is, of course, sensitive to the assumption we made about department aﬃliation of fair attendants
who did not register at our desk. If we make the extreme assumption that all non-registered individuals come
from D = 0 departments, the fair participation rate for group 10 would drop to 11 percent but still be higher than
for group 00 (which would go up to 9 percent). In addition, we show below that the increase in fair attendance
in the group 10 is parallelled by an increase in their TDA participation.
11The estimates for β1 and β2 are reported on Panel A of Table II for fair attendance, [column
(1)], and TDA enrollment after 4.5 months [column (2)] and 11 months [column (3)]. These esti-
mates correspond to the diﬀerence in fair attendance and TDA enrollment between treated and
untreated departments reported in columns (1) and (4) of Table I respectively. The regressions
also include ﬁxed-eﬀects for the stratiﬁcation triplet (see Section III), as well as controls for
background variables gender, year of service, age, and salary. All standard errors are corrected
standard errors for clustering at the department level.14 Being in a treated department increases
the probability of attending the fair by 16.6 percentage points. It also increases signiﬁcantly the
TDA enrollment rate by 0.93 and 1.25 percentage points (after 4.5 and 11 months).
Obtaining signiﬁcant diﬀerences between these randomly chosen groups means that our
experiment did have an impact on TDA enrollment. This impact is large in relative terms (an
increase of 24 percent and 19 percent in the likelihood of enrollment after 4.5 and 11 months).
However, because people update their TDA status very infrequently, it is small in absolute terms
(an increase of only 1.25 percentage points of enrollment, on a base of 34 percent). This eﬀect
is tiny compared to interventions that change the default rules for TDA enrollment (such as in
Madrian and Shea [2001], and Choi et al., [2001a, 2001b]) or that oﬀer individuals the option
to allocate automatically future pay raises to TDA contributions [Thaler and Benartzi, 2001].
In order to separately estimate the eﬀect of receiving the letter personally and that of just
being in a department where some colleagues received the letter, we run the following reduced
form regressions:
fij = α1 + µ1Lij + δ1Dj + ij, (3)
and
yij = α2 + µ2Lij + δ2Dj + ηij. (4)
The results of these regressions are reported on Panel B of Table II. The parameters µ1
and µ2 capture the diﬀerence in fair attendance and TDA enrollment between groups 11 and
10 [columns (2) and (3) of Table I]. The parameters δ1 and δ2 capture the diﬀerence in fair
attendance and TDA enrollment between groups 10 and 00 [columns (3) and (4) of Table I].
14Adding the triplet dummies reduces the standard errors, by absorbing some unexplained diﬀerences across
departments of similar sizes and pre-fair TDA enrollment rates. Baseline covariates are also included to improve
the precision of our estimates.
12Consistent with the results from Table I, being in a treated department increases the probability
of attendance by 10.2 percentage points, and receiving the letter increases it further by 12.9
percentage points. These results suggest that the promise of the $20 reward did have a strong
impact on the decision to attend the fair. Moreover, the fact that colleagues received the letter
also increased one’s probability of attending. These peer eﬀects can be explained in two ways.
First, an employee who sees colleagues receiving the inducement letter might be reminded of
the fair and be led to think that this is an important event (worth rewarding employees for
attending) and thus might decide to attend herself. Second, individuals who receive the letter
and decide to go to the fair might ask their colleagues to join them. Our experiment does not
allow us to separate these two eﬀects but does allow us to conclude that social interactions play
an important role in the decision to attend the fair.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table II show that receiving the letter does not increase the probabil-
ity of enrolling in the TDA (the eﬀect is slightly negative but insigniﬁcant after 4.5 months and
slightly positive but insigniﬁcant as well after 11 months), while being in a treated department
does increase the probability of TDA enrollment (by 1.25 and 1.23 percentage points after 4.5
and 11 months).15 The next section presents simple models to interpret these results.
5 Estimating the Eﬀects of the Experiment
5.1 The Model
We posit the following simple speciﬁcation to explain the eﬀect of the experiment on TDA
enrollment:
yij = α + γifij + Γ · Dj + uij. (5)
This equation states that an individual’s decision to participate in the TDA is potentially
inﬂuenced by their own attendance at the fair as well as by whether some colleagues received
inducement letters (treatment department dummy D). The eﬀect of being in a treated depart-
ment could be direct (when many people go to the fair, their colleagues feel compelled to go to
the fair as well, and to enroll in the TDA), channelled through conventional peer eﬀects (higher
15The estimate after 4.5 months is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level while the coeﬃcient after 11 months has a
t-statistic of 1.45.
13fair attendance in a department leads to higher TDA participation, which in turn inﬂuences
the participation of others), or resulting from the diﬀusion of the information obtained at the
fair. Here again, these eﬀects cannot be separately identiﬁed, and we will make no attempt to
separate them.
The individual fair eﬀect γi may vary across individuals in our sample, for at least two
reasons. First, the eﬀect of attending the fair on TDA participation could vary across individuals.
In particular, our experiment induced two distinct groups of individuals to attend the fair. Those
who were in treated departments (D = 1), and those who in addition to being in a treated
department, received the inducement letter themselves (D = 1, L = 1). As we discuss below,
the eﬀect of the fair may be diﬀerent for these two groups.
Second, it is conceivable that, even for an individual who would have come to the fair with
no external inducement, receiving the letter oﬀering the $20 reward aﬀects the fair eﬀectiveness.
Because the individual is now paid to attend the fair, she might convince herself that she is
coming just for the $20 and thus that she is not really interested in the content of the fair.
This type of eﬀect is not standard in economic models but there is substantial evidence in the
psychology literature on the motivational consequences of rewards. This literature is summarized
in Ross and Nisbett [1991, pp. 65-67] and more recently in Frey and Jegen [2001].
This motivational reward eﬀect can be captured by assuming that the treatment eﬀect γi
is potentially (negatively) correlated with the letter treatment Lij. In order to simplify the
presentation, let us assume that γi takes the following simple form:
γi = γS
i − νLij, (6)
where γS
i (the standard treatment eﬀect component) is independent of Lij, and ν represents the
motivational reward eﬀect. Assuming no motivational reward eﬀect amounts to simply assuming
that ν = 0 and thus that γi is independent of Lij.
Each individual belongs to one of the groups 11, 10, or 00. In order to deﬁne treatment
eﬀects of fair attendance on TDA enrollment, it is useful to introduce the notion of potential
outcomes for fair attendance. For each individual, we denote by fij(11), fij(10), and fij(00) the
fair attendance decision of individual i, had he been in group 11, 10, or 00. Obviously, for each
individual ij, we observe only one of the three potential outcomes for fair attendance. As the
14literature on diﬀerential treatment eﬀects has recognized [Imbens and Angrist, 1994], in order
to be able to identify parameters of interest, we need to make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Monotonicity assumption: For each individual i, fij(11) ≥ fij(10) ≥ fij(00).
This assumption states that receiving the letter can only encourage an individual to attend
the fair (and in no case deter them), and that having one’s colleagues receive the letter can
also only encourage an individual to attend the fair. This assumption sounds very plausible
in the situation we analyze. The Monotonicity assumption implies that the population can be
partitioned into four diﬀerent types.
First, the never takers are individuals such that fij(11) = fij(10) = fij(00) = 0. These
individuals would not attend regardless of the group to which they belong. Second, we deﬁne
the ﬁnancial reward compliers type as individuals such that fij(11) = 1 > fij(10) = fij(00) = 0.
These individuals attend the fair only if they receive the letter with the ﬁnancial reward promise.
Third, we deﬁne the social interaction compliers as individuals such that fij(11) = fij(10) =
1 > fij(00) = 0. These individuals would not attend the fair if nobody in their department
receives the letter, but attend the fair if they are in a treated department (whether or not they
themselves receive the letter). Finally, we deﬁne the always takers as individuals such that
fij(11) = fij(10) = fij(00) = 1. These individuals attend the fair regardless of the group to
which they belong.
We make the following additional assumption.
Assumption 2 Exclusion restriction assumption: uij is independent of Lij and Dj
The assumption that the error term uij is independent of the letter assignment status Lij means
that the letter inviting the employee to the fair has no direct eﬀect on TDA participation
decisions of those who do not attend the fair (beyond its eﬀect on individual and departmental
fair attendance). Likewise, the fact that other people received the letter is assumed to have no
eﬀect on TDA participation. To ensure the validity of Assumption 2, we did not mention TDA
in the letters, and the letter did not contain any mention of the employee’s TDA status (the
letter is reproduced in appendix).16
16A follow-up questionnaire which contained precise questions about savings and the TDA did not have an
15It is now apparent that there are four parameters of interest in the model: The average
treatment eﬀect for ﬁnancial reward compliers E[γi|fij(11) − fij(10) = 1], the average treat-
ment eﬀect for social interaction compliers E[γi|fij(10) − fij(00) = 1], the social network eﬀect
parameter Γ, and the motivational reward eﬀect ν. However, our experiment provides us with
only two instruments Lij and Dij, making it impossible to identify all four parameters. Only
if we make additional assumptions about two of these four parameters can we estimate the
remaining two parameters. In the next subsection, we discuss alternative sets of assumptions
under which the remaining parameters of the model could be estimated. Our goal is not to
claim that any particular set of assumptions is correct, but rather to explore the implications of
each assumption, and to provide bounds to the diﬀerent eﬀects.
5.2 Interpretation under Alternative Identiﬁcation Assumptions
If we assume that there is no motivational reward eﬀect (ν = 0) and γi is equal to γ for all
individuals, equation (5) reduces to
yij = α + γfij + Γ · Dj + uij. (7)
This is a standard Instrumental Variables setup, and both parameters γ and Γ are identiﬁed.
They can be obtained by an IV estimation of equation (7), using Dj and Lij as instruments.
These estimates are presented in Column (1) in Table III. The results show, as we expected from
Section IV, that the direct eﬀect of fair attendance is zero while the social eﬀect of being in a
treated department is positive (and signiﬁcant after 4.5 months). Being in a treated department
increases the probability of enrollment by 1.8 and 1.2 percentage points (after 4.5 and 11 months
respectively). Under this set of assumptions, all the eﬀects of the experiment are channelled
indirectly through the social eﬀect.
If we assume away social network eﬀects, the parameter Γ is equal to zero, and equation (5)
then reduces to
yij = α + γifij + uij. (8)
eﬀect on TDA enrollment (see Duﬂo and Saez, [2000b] for details). As a result, it is highly unlikely that the
inducement letter could have had an eﬀect on TDA enrollment.
16If we assume ﬁrst that there are no motivational reward eﬀects (ν = 0), then an IV regression
of equation (8) using Lij as an instrument for fij for the subsample of treated departments
(Dj = 1) provides an estimate of the average treatment eﬀect of ﬁnancial incentive compliers,
E[γi|fij(11) − fij(10) = 1].17 The estimates are reported on Column (2) of Table III. As
we expected, the average treatment eﬀect for ﬁnancial incentives compliers is zero and not
signiﬁcant. Since it is reasonable to assume that the fair does not have a negative eﬀect on
any individual’s participation decision, the very small coeﬃcient in column (2) (even slightly
negative after 4.5 months) would imply that the treatment eﬀect is very close to zero for all
ﬁnancial reward compliers, which seems unrealistic. This suggests that there was very likely a
motivational reward eﬀect associated with receiving the letter.
The average treatment eﬀect for social interaction compliers E[γi|fij(10) − fij(00) = 1] can
be obtained by an IV regression of (8) using Dj as an instrument for fij for the subsample
of individuals with no letter (Lij = 0). Column (3) in Table III presents these IV estimates,
for TDA enrollment 4.5 months and 11 months after the fair. The estimates are positive and
signiﬁcant showing that attending the fair increases the probability of enrolling by 11.7 and 13.1
percentage points after 4.5 and 11 months in this sample. The social interaction compliers are
clearly not aﬀected by the motivational reward, but may be subject to peer eﬀects. Therefore,
the IV estimates is an upper bound of the direct eﬀect of the fair. These eﬀects are of comparable
size (slightly higher) than those estimated by Madrian and Shea [2002] in a non-experimental
setup. Therefore, the IV estimates suggest a positive treatment eﬀect on social interaction
compliers, and no eﬀect on ﬁnancial reward compliers. This diﬀerential treatment eﬀect is
plausible. Those who attend because of the reward may be less interested in the fair than those
who decide to attend because of their colleagues.
If we assume that there are motivational reward eﬀects, then the estimates in Column (2)
give the average treatment eﬀect for ﬁnancial reward compliers less the motivational reward
eﬀect. We cannot obtain estimates of the motivational reward eﬀects unless we assume that, in
absence of motivational reward eﬀects, the treatment eﬀect would be constant for both groups
of compliers. In that case, all the diﬀerence between Columns (3) and (2) can be attributed to
17Note that the presence of social eﬀects would not bias this estimate as the social eﬀect is assumed to be
constant within departments in equation (5).
17motivational reward eﬀects. Under these assumptions, straightforward computations [see Duﬂo
and Saez, 2000b] show that receiving the letter reduces the treatment eﬀect of the fair by 63
percent for TDA participation after 4.5 months, and 41 percent for TDA participation after 11
months.
It is useful to compare the eﬀects of fair attendance on TDA enrollment of columns (2) and
(3) with the OLS eﬀect obtained by regressing TDA enrollment on fair attendance. The OLS
estimates are reported in column (4) for the sample of individuals who received the letter.18
The OLS coeﬃcient after 11 months is positive and signiﬁcant, and would lead the researcher to
conclude that the fair increased participation by 4.9 percentage points for those who attended
it. This coeﬃcient, as expected, is biased upward by selection bias.
In column (5), we present the “naive” IV estimate that uses the letter dummy as an in-
strument, in the complete sample, without taking social eﬀect into account. This estimate lies
between the estimates of column (2) and column (3). The naive estimate would underestimate
the overall eﬀect of the fair (since part of the “control” group is actually treated) and over-
estimate the direct eﬀect on those who received the letter. This shows the potential bias in
randomized trials that ignores externalities.
The distinction between diﬀerential treatment eﬀects, social network eﬀects, and motiva-
tional reward eﬀects is clear conceptually but our experiment does not allow us to tell them
apart. Thus, it is useful to describe what type of alternative experimental designs would be
needed to separate these eﬀects. Diﬀerential treatment eﬀects arise in our setting because there
is a ﬁrst stage in our experiment where individuals decide whether or not to attend the fair. As
a result, only a self-selected fraction of individuals attends the fair. Motivational reward eﬀects
arise because individuals receive a monetary payment for attending the fair.
Social network eﬀects could be identiﬁed with the following experiment. Within a subsample
of “treated” departments, a subsample of employees would all automatically attend an informa-
tion session targeted to them only (and not their colleagues). This could be done by making
attendance a job requirement for these employees. One could then test whether the TDA partic-
ipation of non-attendees in treated departments rises relative to that of individuals in untreated
18That is the only group where we have actual individual fair attendance information. Computing the OLS
estimate in the sample of controls would have been more interesting but is unfortunately unfeasible.
18departments. Motivational reward eﬀects could be estimated by paying people for attending
an information session in a situation where everybody is supposed to attend. For example, in
many ﬁrms, new hires are often invited to attend information sessions about beneﬁts. In some
departments, this information session could be presented as a normal process through which all
new employees go. In other departments, attending this information session could be presented
as voluntary but a ﬁnancial reward could be oﬀered for attendance (large enough to induce
virtually everybody to attend). If everybody attends in both cases, the average treatment eﬀect
would be expected to be the same in both groups in the absence of a motivational reward eﬀect.
Evidence of diﬀerential treatment eﬀects could potentially be obtained by using non-monetary
incentives of various intensity to attend the fair. For example, some employees could be sent a
letter simply reminding them of the beneﬁts fair. Others could be sent a more pointed letter
telling them that important information can be obtained at the fair. One could also use e-mails,
personal phone calls or even remind them in person to attend the fair. These diﬀerent encour-
agement designs are associated with diﬀerent groups of compliers and may thus allow estimation
of diﬀerential fair treatment eﬀects.
5.3 Additional Evidence
In order to cast further light on our results, we have divided our sample by size of department,
pre-experiment TDA participation rate, gender, salary, and years of service. These results are
reported on Table IV. Column (1) reports fair attendance among those who received the letter
(we know the identity of those who attended the fair only for this group). Fair participation
was larger in small departments than in large departments, and for women than for men. In
columns (2) and (3), we show the diﬀerence in TDA enrollment between treated and control
departments after 4.5 and 11 months, respectively.
Panel A shows that the TDA enrollment eﬀects are about the same in large and in small
departments. Panel B shows that eﬀects appear to be stronger in smaller departments than
larger ones after 11 months. Panel C shows that the eﬀects are the same for men and women.
After 4.5 months, the treatment eﬀect seems somewhat larger in departments where average
salaries are high (Panel D), or for employees with more years of service (Panel E). However,
after 11 months, this diﬀerence is actually reversed (in Panels D and E). This suggests that it
19takes more time for those in departments with lower salaries or seniority to adjust their TDA
participation. Overall, there is no evidence that treatment eﬀects are widely diﬀerent across
groups deﬁned by observables after 11 months. However, most of the coeﬃcients in Table IV
are imprecisely estimated and caution should be taken in the interpretation of results.
As mentioned above, following our experiment, we sent out a follow up questionnaire to 917
employees designed to measure the employees’ knowledge of the retirement beneﬁts system in
the university, as well as questions to elicit alternative retirement savings options available to
employees and to measure the extent of procrastination. All the results are described in detail in
Duﬂo and Saez [2002b]. Interestingly, we found that satisfaction with the fair was signiﬁcantly
higher for group 11 than for group 10. This is consistent both with diﬀerential treatment eﬀects
and motivational reward eﬀects. The questionnaire results also show that individuals in group
11 do not seem to have a better knowledge of retirement beneﬁts than those in group 10, even
though they are less likely to think that they suﬀer from a lack of information.
6 Conclusion
Small ﬁnancial incentives have successfully induced treated employees, as well as members of
their peer groups, to attend a beneﬁts fair. Moreover, individuals aﬀected by the experiment,
whether directly or indirectly, are more likely to enroll in the TDA after the fair. Interestingly,
the direct eﬀect is no larger than the indirect eﬀect: in treated departments, those who received
the letter and those who did not are about as likely to subsequently enroll in the TDA. We pro-
posed three diﬀerent interpretations of this ﬁnding: diﬀerential treatment eﬀects, social network
eﬀects, and motivational reward eﬀects. Our experiment does not allow us to unambiguously
distinguish these interpretations, which illustrate how the analysis of a simple experiment in a
social and economic context may be substantially more complicated than expected.
These three diﬀerent explanations have, however, a common feature. They suggest that an
individual’s decision to participate in the TDA is aﬀected by small changes in the environment,
and not only by the information content of the fair. The strong social eﬀects obtained in the fair
attendance decision are not of primary economic interest per se. However, they are important in
an indirect way, as they lead to signiﬁcant changes in the decision to enroll in the TDA, which is
20a very important economic decision. Thus, social network eﬀects deﬁnitely caused some people
to take steps which ultimately led them to change their TDA participation decision.
The increase in TDA contribution generated by this experiment was much larger than its
costs. Our program increased participation after one year by about 1.25 percentage points for
the 4,000 non-enrolled employees in treated departments relative to control departments. Hence
our experiment induced 50 extra employees to start contributing to the TDA. Assuming that
such employees contributed about $4,000 per year (the average contribution of newly enrolled
employees),19 the extra TDA savings generated by our experiment is about $200,000 per year.
If the treatment eﬀect persists for many years, the total extra TDA savings could be many times
that amount. Therefore, the extra savings obtained is without doubt very large relative to the
inducement cost (the rewards distributed amounted to about $12,000).20
However, these eﬀects remain very small compared to changing default enrollment rules
[Madrian and Shea, 2001] or oﬀering delayed enrollment, as in the “Save More Tomorrow”
program [Thaler and Benartzi, 2001]. The large eﬀect of a small reward on fair attendance,
ampliﬁed by social eﬀects, also suggests that individuals do not optimally seek out and process
available information on their own. This suggests that individuals may not be giving much
thought to their retirement savings decisions. This has extremely important policy implications
for the optimal design of retirement plans.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND NBER
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY AND NBER
19After 11 months, the average yearly contribution of new contributors is $4,000 and that ﬁgure is almost
identical across groups 11, 10, and 00. New contributors also contribute $4,000 on average after 4.5 months
suggesting that employees rarely update their contribution levels after they enroll in the plan.
20Moreover, this does not take into account potential eﬀects on other beneﬁts decisions, which are likely to be
impacted by the fair as well. Unfortunately, we do not have access to the data on other beneﬁts to study these
other eﬀects.
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25Untreated
All Treated Untreated departments
(group D=1) (group D=1,L=1) (group D=1,L=0) (group D=0)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PANEL A: BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS
TDA participation 0.010 0.009 0.011 0.012
before the fair (Sept. 2000) (.0015) (.0021) (.0022) (.0024)
Observations 4168 2039 2129 2043
Sex (fraction male) 0.398 0.400 0.396 0.418
(.0076) (.0109) (.0107) (.011)
Years of service 5.898 5.864 5.930 6.008
(.114) (.161) (.16) (.157)
Annual salary 38,547 38,807 38,297 38,213
(304) (438) (422) (416)
Age 38.3 38.4 38.2 38.7
(.17) (.24) (.24) (.24)
Observations 4126 2020 2106 2018
PANEL B: FAIR ATTENDANCE (REGISTRATION DATA)
Fair attendance rate 0.214 0.280 0.151 0.049
among non-TDA enrollees (.0064) (.01) (.0078) (.0048)
Observations 4126 2020 2106 2018
Fair attendance rate 0.192 0.063
for all staff employes (.0132) (.0103)
Observations 6687 3311
PANEL C: TDA PARTICIPATION (ADMINISTRATIVE DATA)
TDA participation rate after 0.049 0.045 0.053 0.040
4.5 months (.0035) (.0049) (.0051) (.0045)
Observations 3726 1832 1894 1861
TDA participation rate after 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.075
11 months (.005) (.0071) (.007) (.0065)
Observations 3246 1608 1638 1633
a. Standard errors in parentheses. 
b. The first part of Panel B includes all individuals not enrolled in the TDA by
September 2000. The second part includes all employes (enrolled or not in the TDA).
c. The average fair participation in the non-treated department was obtained from the registration 
information collected at the fair. Since only 75% of the participants 
registered, the participation was adjusted by a proportionality factor.
d. Demographic information and TDA participation are all obtained from administrative data.
Treated departments
Descriptive Statistics, By Groups
TABLE IFair 
attendance  4.5 months 11 months
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: Average effect of department treatment
Treated 0.166 0.0093 0.0125
Department dummy D (.013) (.0043) (.0065)
Observations 6144 5587 4879
PANEL B: Effect of letter and department treatments
Letter dummy L 0.129 -0.0066 0.0005
(.0226) (.0061) (.0102)
Treated 0.102 0.0125 0.0123
Department dummy D (.0139) (.0054) (.0086)
Observations 6144 5587 4879
a. Dependent variables are individual fair participation (column (1)), TDA enrollment 4.5 months and 11
months after the fair (columns (2) and (3)).
b. Independent variable in Panel A is the department treatment dummy D.
c. Independent variables in Panel B are the individual letter dummy L and the department treatment dummy D.
d. All regressions control for the triplet of the department, gender, year of service, age, and salary.




Reduced Forms Estimates (OLS)Assuming constant
treatment effects Effect on financial Effect on social  OLS Naïve IV
incentive compliers interation compliers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PANEL A: Dependent variable: TDA participation after 4.5 months
Fair attendance -0.046 -0.050 0.117 0.016 -0.002
(.0431) (.0429) (.0465) (.0109) (.0255)
Treated department 0.018
(.0092)
Observations 5587 3726 3755 1832 5587
PANEL B: Dependent variable TDA participation after 11 montab42
Fair attendance 0.003 0.005 0.131 0.049 0.032
(.0681) (.0685) (.0826) (.018) (.0397)
Treated department 0.012
(.0147)
Observations 4879 3246 3271 1608 4879
Sample  Entire sample Treated departments No letter only Letter only Entire sample
a. Dependent variables are individual enrollment in the TDA 4.5 months and 11months after the fair.
b. Independent variable are individual fair attendance and department treatment dummy D in column (1). 
c. Independent variable is individual fair attendance in columns (2) to (5).
d. All regressions control for the triplet of the department, gender, year of service, age, and salary.
e. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the department level.
Asssuming no social effects
TABLE III
IV Estimates of Fair Attendance and Department Effects on TDA EnrollmentFair attendance among TDA participation TDA participation
letter recipients (L=1) after 4.5 months after 11 months
(1) (2) (3)
PANEL A: DEPARMENT SIZE
Below median (81) 0.328 0.008 0.007
(.015) (.007) (.0104)
Observations 985 2797 2403
Above median (81) 0.235 0.007 0.012
(.0132) (.0047) (.0087)
Observations 1035 2790 2476
PANEL B: DEPARTMENT AVERAGE PARTICIPATION IN THE TDA BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT
Below median (34%) 0.259 0.009 0.018
(.0134) (.0064) (.0098)
Observations 1062 2929 2523
Above median (34%) 0.304 0.010 0.008
(.0149) (.0063) (.0089)
Observations 958 2658 2356
PANEL C: GENDER
Women 0.320 0.011 0.012
(.0134) (.0072) (.0117)
Observations 1213 3298 2843
Men 0.221 0.008 0.010
(.0146) (.007) (.0085)
Observations 807 2289 2036
PANEL D: SALARY
Below median ($34,021) 0.269 0.003 0.018
(.0141) (.0065) (.0093)
Observations 983 2745 2291
Above median ($34,021) 0.291 0.015 0.010
(.0141) (.0063) (.0104)
Observations 1037 2842 2588
PANEL E: YEARS OF SERVICE
Below median (2.84 years) 0.312 0.005 0.015
(.0145) (.0071) (.0115)
Observations 1027 2706 2196
Above median (2.84 years) 0.248 0.013 0.010
(.0137) (.0054) (.0083)
Observations 993 2881 2683
a. The sample in column (1) is composed of individuals in group 11 only.
a. In columns (2) and (3), dependent variables is TDA enrollment 4.5 months and 11 months after the fair.
Independent variable is department treatment dummy D. 
c. Regressions in columns (2) and (3) control for the triplet of the department, gender, year of service, age, and salary.
d. Standard errors (reported in paretheses below the coefficient) corrected for clustering at the department level.
Difference group D=1 - group   D=0
TABLE IV


















You have just received your Open Enrollment packet from the Benefits Services Group, inviting you to the 
Benefits Fair 2001.  
 
The Fair will be held in two locations:  
 








This year, as part of a study (conducted jointly by the Benefits Services Group and economics researchers) 
to better understand the impact of the Fair on benefits choices, we are offering a reward of $20 to 2,000 
employees, just for attending the Fair.  Funding for these rewards was contributed from a research grant.  
We selected those employees by a simple lottery, and your name was among those drawn. 
 
In order to receive this $20 reward, all you have to do is to come to the Fair with this letter, and give your 
name at the registration table that will be located in the main hall.  You will receive a check within the two 
weeks following the Fair. 
 
We hope that you will find the Fair helpful in making your benefits choices. However, we want to 
emphasize that the reward is completely independent of your benefits decisions. 
 





Name of the Benefits Office 
Associate Director 